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Law Commissions and Access to
Justice: What Justice Should We Be
Talking About?
PATRICIA HUGHES*
In addition to their explicit mandates, law reform commissions have a generic mandate to
make recommendations that are designed to increase access to justice. Moreover, contempo-
rary commissions ought to interpret the concept of access to justice broadly. Even though
they undertake topics of 'lawyers' law,' or at times limit their focus to the narrower legal
system, commissions should also consider how law can be employed to realize economic or
social justice. In order to make pragmatic recommendations to increase access to justice.
commissions must study the non-legal realm and incorporate into their work the insights
of other disciplines and the experiences of diverse communities. Furthermore, commissions
must distinguish themselves from other law reform bodies by addressing the larger, more
profound tasks that have the potential to redefine the meaning of access to justice.
En plus de leurs mandats explicites, les commissions de La r6forme du droit sont charg6es
d'un mandat g6n~rique: celui de formuler des recommandations 6tudi~es pour augmenter
I'acc~s Ia justice. Qui plus est, les commissions contemporaines devraient interpreter le
concept d'un acc~s plus 6tendu [a justice. Mime si eles entreprennent des probl~mes de
<< droit de l'avocat > ou limitent parfois leur champ au syst~me juridique plus restreint, les
commissions devraient 6gatement se pencher sur La question de savoir comment [a loi peut
servir A r6aliser [a justice 6conomique ou sociale. Afin de formuler des recommandations
pragmatiques en vue d'augmenter L'acc~s 6 ta justice, les commissions doivent 6tudier Le
domaine non l6gal et incorporer teur travail les connaissances venues d'autres disciplines
et les exp6riences de communaut6s diversifi6es. En outre, les commissions doivent se
distinguer des autres organismes de r6forme de [a [oi en s'attetant aux t~ches plus 6ten-
dues et plus profondes qui poss~dent le potentiel de red~finir Le sens de L'acc~s 6 [a justice.
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IT IS COMMON TO THE MANDATES of law (reform) commissions1 that they are
to make recommendations to simplify, maintain currency, or fill gaps in the
law.2 Less commonly, but not infrequently, commissions are enjoined to make
recommendations to improve the administration of justice (as is the case with
1. For my purposes, whether "reform" appears in the commission's name is not significant,
although some believe the use of "reform" suggests a narrower mandate than does its
omission. See e.g. Roderick A. Macdonald, "Jamais Deux Sans Trois ... Once Reform, Twice
Commission, Thrice Law" (2007) 22 C.J.L.S. 117 at 132 [Macdonald, "Jamais"]; K.J. Keith,
"Has professional law reform met expectations?" (Paper presented to the Australian Law
Reform Agencies Conference, Wellington, New Zealand, 16 April 2004), online: New
Zealand Law Commission (NZLC) <http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/SpeechPaper.aspx>. A
former NZLC president has described that agency's name as implying that law reform was
not to be "the whole" of its mandate; it was to also offer "another view [next to the existing
law] where we consider the public interest demands." David Baragwanath, "The Role of the
New Zealand Law Commission" (2001) New Zealand Centre for Public Law Occasional
Papers 2 at 14, online: <http://www.victoria.ac.nz/nzcpl/Files/Occ papers/Baragwanath web
paper.pdf>. On the other hand, it has been suggested that underlying "[t]he creation of
standing law reform bodies was that the whole idea of law reform was reconceptualised."
Marcia Neave, "Law Reform in the 21st Century-Some Challenges for the Future"
(Lecture delivered 11 October 2001) [unpublished], online: Victorian Law Commission
<http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/Law+Reform/Home/Newsroom/
Speeches/LAWREFORM+-+Law+Reform+in+the+21"+Century+speech> [Neave, "21st
Century"]. Neave suggests that "reform" means not merely "change," but making the law
more responsive to shifting societal needs and using law to improve people's lives. Marcia
Neave, "The Ethics of Law Reform" (Lecture delivered at the Centre for Applied Philosophy
and Public Ethics, University of Melbourne, 11 August 2004) [unpublished], online:
<http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/Law+Reform/Home/Newsroom/
Speeches/LAWREFORM+-+Ethics+of+Law+Reform+speech> [Neave, "Reform"].
2. These are the purposes identified in the mandate of the Law Reform Commission of Nova
Scotia (LRCNS), but they are typical of the mandate of most law commissions. Less typical
is the injunction to the LRCNS to make recommendations for the "review of judicial and
quasi-judicial procedures." Law Reform Commission Act, S.N.S. 1990, c. 17, s. 4.
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the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia (LRCNS)). Some commissions
seem to have a more restricted mandate than others. Compare, for example, the
purpose of the New Zealand Law Commission Act, which is "to promote the sys-
tematic review, reform, and development of the law of New Zealand"3 with
that of the LRCNS to develop "new approaches to, and new concepts of, law
that serve the changing needs of society and of individual members of society."'
Although few commissions' mandates actually state as much,5 one might
say that, in general terms, the mandate of law reform commissions is to make
recommendations with the objective of increasing access to justice, whether in
the form of making legislation easier to read or making the law more reflective
of contemporary social conditions. One might call this a generic mandate,
against which specific, often statutory, mandates should be assessed. I argue
that it is inherent in the notion of a contemporary law commission in a liberal
democracy-part of its generic mandate, one might say-that it be concerned
with questions related to enhancing access to justice, broadly defined. Access to
justice is a shorthand or catch-all description of the mandate, whether commis-
sions focus on doctrinal questions or "place more emphasis on changing the
informal norms, which influence human conduct"; whether their role is "to
improve the law as it is written or to bring about broader social and cultural
change"; or whether they busy themselves with policy or not.' Whether or not a
law commission is enjoined explicitly to make recommendations to increase
3. Law Commission Act 1985 (N.Z.), 1985/151, s. 3. The Commission is to engage in a
systematic review of the law, to make recommendations for "reform ... and development of
the law," and to advise on ways to make the law "as understandable and accessible as is
practicable." Unusually, it is also to advise on reviews of the law undertaken by government
departments or organizations. See s. 5(1). Although the wording of the statute is narrower
than that of others, the comments related, supra note 2, suggest that the actual wording may
be less important than one might think.
4. Supra note 2.
5. One exception is the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), the mandate of which is
to review Commonwealth laws in relation to matters referred to it by the Attorney General
in order to reform the law, particularly by "providing improved access to justice," among
other means. See Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth.), s. 21. See also the
ALRC's website, which states that it "aims [to] improve access to justice," among other
objectives. "About the ALRC," online: <http://www.alrc.gov.au/about/index.htm>.
6. Marcia Neave, "Institutional Law Reform in Australia: The Past and the Future" (2005) 23
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 343 at 349-50 [Neave, "Australia"]. Neave identifies Canada as
the site for this debate about law commissions' roles.
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access to justice, few law commissions today would deny that they should not
only recommend legislative reform, but also relate law to societal needs.
Unless the mandate, is explicitly restrictive, the injunction to ensure that
the law is current or that it responds to changing conditions, however actually
phrased, lends itself to narrow or broad interpretation. Thus, the more impor-
tant point is how commissions understand the phrase "access to justice" in light
of other explicit aspects of their mandate or other relevant factors, such as how
their purpose is described when they are created. While a commission's explicit
mandate is not insignificant in giving content to the phrase, more can be learned
by examining how the commission goes about its business. Furthermore, its
processes, its reports and other documents, and who its work reaches can reveal
much about whether a commission satisfies its own access to justice rhetoric.
My purpose here is to explore the relationship between commission processes
and various interpretations of access to justice. In particular, I suggest that the
broader the concept of "justice" we expect a commission to engage in, the more
extensive its consultation processes and the sources it brings to its analysis must
necessarily be.
Law reform commissions have great potential to contribute to enhancing
access to justice, broadly defined-that is, to "bring about broader social and
cultural change," in Neave's words-but it is important that their approach
takes account of the views and experiences of those affected by law or, in other
words, those for whom access to justice is meant to be enhanced. Similarly, reli-
ance only on legal concepts, structures, and recommendations will fail to extend
access to justice beyond the legal system in any significant way. Incorporation
of external bodies of knowledge and methods of analysis, as well as recommen-
dations that recognize that law is "in the world," are imperative for a commission
if it is to make a contribution to the wider notion of access to justice.
Underlying this exploration is the premise that law reform is not merely
about "changing" the law.' Rather, the law reform process connotes increasing
7. William Hurlburt reviews the various ways in which the concept of law reform had been
interpreted until the mid-1980s. While some observers limited its application to a narrow
range of strictly legal changes, others intended its usage to refer to more extensive changes,
sometimes to the extent of viewing all changes as having more than a strictly legal component.
William H. Hurlburt, Law Reform Commissions in the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada
(Edmonton: Juriliber, 1986) at 3-6. Hurlburt concluded that law reform involves change,
improvement, and conservation of essential factors (at 7). I am using the term "law reform"
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access to justice by providing more people with meaningful access to courts,
tribunals, and other dispute resolution processes, and thus to legal process, to
the substance of law, or, more broadly, to the rights and benefits generally
available to society by the mechanism of law. Fundamental to how well a law
reform commission can accomplish this task is the extent to which it involves
the public and the insights of disciplines other than law in its work.
After considering in Part I how "access to justice" has been conceptualized,
I discuss in Part I why a core function of law commissions should be to ad-
vance a broad conception. In Part III, I discuss what it means for law commis-
sions to advance a broader conception of access to justice, and I then consider
in Part IV what they must do if their work is to reflect it. I conclude in Part V by
placing law commissions in perspective.
I. CONCEPTUALIZING "ACCESS TO JUSTICE"8
It has been suggested that "access-to-justice forms an integral part of the rule of
law in constitutional democracies,"9 although this is perhaps more an aspirational
statement than one of fact. Access to justice has, however, become part of main-
stream thought about a "fair" legal system."0 At its most basic level, "access to
loosely to include technical changes (sometimes called "lawyers' law") that may be narrow
and broad changes that involve the consideration of non-legal contexts in addition to law. In
both cases, however, at a minimum, the intent must be to "improve" the law or to extend its
benefits to persons previously excluded. Thus, law reform has normative content.
8. Although I do not go so far in the context of law reform commissions, a quick perusal of the
table of contents of the Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice indicates how broadly "justice"
might be defined. In its first issue, most of the articles were associated with the legal system,
but at least one addressed the difference in theoretical approach between socio-legal studies
and the sociology of law-the former being concerned with issues such as access to justice,
legal effectiveness, and plea-bargaining, and the latter considering law as a form of social
control. See David Nelkin, "The 'Gap Problem' in the Sociology of Law: A Theoretical
Review" (1981) 1 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 35. Note that "access to justice" is treated as the
equivalent of plea-bargaining, and not a broader category of which plea-bargaining might be
a discrete example. Subsequent volumes have been devoted to issues such as reparations
(2003) and legal education (1999 and 2001), and there are many individual articles that go
Far beyond a narrow notion of access to the legal system, whether in Canada or elsewhere.
9. Faisal Bhabha, "Institutionalizing Access-to-Justice: Judicial, Legislative and Grassroots
Dimensions" (2007) 33 Queen's L.J. 139 at 140.
10. For instance, while the specific phrase is not employed, the intent is similar in the Ministry
of the Attorney General of Ontario's "Justice on Target" project. A major focus is on
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justice" is synonymous with "access to the legal system,"" although one might
also view the "legal system" instrumentally as simply what the law is and how it
is enforced and processed-activities that may have little to do with justice,
fairness, or equity.12 In this respect, access to justice means simply (but not in-
significantly) making it easier for people to use the legal system or making the
legal system more "accessible" (e.g., through more legal aid or more expeditious
proceedings). Indeed, the core aspects of access to justice have been identified as
"reasonable and effective access to courts of law and the opportunity to obtain
legal services from qualified professionals."13 Put slightly differently, it refers to
the removal of barriers to legal access consequent on the high cost of legal rep-
resentation. Means of increasing access to justice in this context are designed
"to make courts and the legal process more accessible" through, for example, the
rules of practice, contingency fees, pro bono representation, and costs awards. 5
It has long been widely recognized that economic factors may impede access
to justice: 6 hence the emphasis on legal aid, pro bono legal representation, less
reducing delays in the criminal law process. See "Justice on Target" (2007), online:
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/jot/>.
11. In many cases, this is considered so obvious that the author of an article on access to justice
will not specify that he or she means "access to the legal system" when using the phrase
"access to justice," although the context will soon make it clear. In contrast, a discussion of
access to justice in South Africa begins, "[ilt is not intended in this paper to debate the
different meanings of justice, such as its social, political or moral meaning. ... This paper is
concerned with justice in the legal sense, more particularly, justice in terms of access to the
civil and criminal courts." David McQuoid-Mason, "Access to Justice in South Africa" (1999)
17 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 230 at 230. McQuoid-Mason refers to issues as diverse as the
race and gender composition of the judiciary-a constitutional matter in South Africa-and
extension of limitation periods as components of access to justice.
12. Roderick A. Macdonald, "Access to Justice and Law Reform" (1990) 10 Windsor Y.B.
Access Just. 287 at 294 [MacDonald, "Access"].
13. Christie v. British Columbia (2005), 262 D.L.R. (4th) 51 at para. 30 (B.C. C.A.) (per
Newbury J.A., speaking for the majority). Newbury J.A. considered these aspects
constitutionally guaranteed, which was not a position upheld by the Supreme Court of
Canada. See British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873.
14. Bhabha, supra note 9 at 141.
15. Ibid.
16. For instance, it has been over fifty years since legal aid was established in Ontario. For the
history of the development of the more community-oriented clinics in Ontario from the
latter part of the 1960s to 1980, see Frederick H. Zemans, "Community Legal Clinics in
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costly ways of determining disputes, and the development of self-help materials.
A broader understanding of access to justice, although still confined to the legal
system, also recognizes that other factors may affect access to the legal system
and, thus, to legal justice.. In addition, access to justice today includes physical
access and requires the removal of barriers through, for example, translation,
sign language interpretation, and accommodation of other physical and mental
challenges.18 There is also increasing recognition of cultural barriers to equitable
access to the legal system, including the courts and administrative tribunals,
which require a reshaping of institutions and processes.19 Most contemporary
law. commissions, at least in countries where these ideas are prevalent, would not
consider their job complete if they had recommended a new way of resolving
certain kinds of disputes, but had not included either recommendations to ensure
equal access to the new forum for everyone or explanations about why they were
not making recommendations to this effect.
While these efforts for, and understandings of, access to justice obviously
require consideration of the needs and experiences of various communities, they
are still focused on the legal system, including legal representation and the courts.
Ontario: 1980- A Data Survey" (1981) 1 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 230. Legal aid and
community clinics are still an active element in the access to justice debate.
17. For a discussion of objective and subjective barriers, see Macdonald, "Access," supra note 12
at 299-302. Objective barriers are said to include the complexity of law, while subjective
barriers may refer to psychological barriers (but these may be the impact of factors such as
age and race) and lack of knowledge.
18. In 2005, then chief justice of Ontario Roy McMurtry established the Courts Disabilities
Committee in order to.bring the courts into conformity with the Ontarians with Disabilities Act,
2001, S.O. 2001, c. 32. For a history of this process and the scope of the committee's work,
see Report of the Disability Issues Committee, "Making Ontario's Courts Fully Accessible to
Persons with Disabilities," online: <http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/en/accessiblecourts.htm>.
The committee's report refers in Part 4 to a 1982 study, by then Family Court Judge Rosalie
Abella, of access to the legal system, rather than to the courts. It is worth noting, given the
passage of time, the committee's observation that "many of the recommendations Judge
Abella made twenty-three years ago remain valid today and yet have not been implemented."
19. For a relatively comprehensive account of how to achieve access to justice in courts and
tribunals, see Judicial Studies Board, "Fairness in courts and tribunals: A Summary of the
Equal Treatment Bench Book" (July 2004), online: <http://www.jsboard.co.uk/downloads/
fairness-guide-flnal.pdf>. The Judicial Studies Board is responsible for training judges and
members of administrative tribunals in England and Wales. This guide encompasses
appropriate language and practices related to race, religion, children, disability, gender, and
sexual orientation.
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Access to justice may also be viewed more broadly to include ways in which law
may be employed to advance or impede other forms of justice (such as social or
economic justice). This view necessarily encompasses the impact of non-legal
actors on the effectiveness of law. Primarily because they treat law as an isolated
branch of knowledge and practice, some people are challenged by the idea that
law commissions are prepared to step outside the comfort of the legal system.
At the very least, however, the category's boundaries are porous, encouraging a
reciprocal relationship with other categories of knowledge and practice.2"
As a result, one can trace the evolution of the meaning of access to justice
from "issues about access to courts and lawyers," including an emphasis on legal
aid, to consideration of "new institutional [or legal] arrangements," "procedural
initiatives," and "community legal education and the prevention of disputes"-
all of which share the notion of availability-to considerations of equality and
fairness, or "the degree to which the citizen has access to and can participate in
the procedures by which substantive law is made."21 The development of access
to justice has also been summarized as a "trajectory from service-oriented, indi-
vidualized strategies of access-to-justice, to more multi-dimensional, integrated
approaches."22 A worthwhile law commission should engage in reform that facili-
tates access to justice across the spectrum, and certainly beyond the basic notions
of access to the institutions of law, forms of dispute resolution, or even language.
In my view, it is part of the core generic mandate of law commissions to study
20. Those who resist the notion that law can be usefully informed by non-legal factors (or believe
that law can act as if that is the case) are usually ready to acknowledge and promote the idea
that law affects other areas of life, whether medical, business, sport, or merely neighbourhood
fences. Law as colonizer is easier to accept than the loss of law's autonomy.
21. Martin Partington, "The Relationship between Law Reform and Access to Justice: A Case
Study -The Renting Homes Project" (2005) 23 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 375 at 376.
Partington describes a project of the Law Commission of England and Wales, suggesting that
it departs from most of the Commission's previous work in the broadness of its approach.
22. Bhabha, supra note 9 at 153, summarizing the waves of access to justice described by Mauro
Cappelletti and Bryant Garth. See Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access tojustice.. A
World Survey, vol. 1 (Milan: Sijthoff and Noordhoff-Alphenaandenrijn, 1978), E-161. See
also Roderick A. Macdonald, "Access-to-justice in Canada Today" in Julia Bass et aL, eds.,
Access to Justice for a New Century: The Way Forward (Toronto: Law Society of Upper
Canada, 2005) 19; Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, "Access to Justice as a Focus for
Research: Foreword" (1981) 1 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. ix. Cappelletti and Garth's three
waves of access to justice are focused on the legal system, but Macdonald's notion of five
waves goes much further afield.
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how law impedes access to social and economic justice in order to develop rec-
ommendations about how law can be employed to advance this access.
II. WHY LAW COMMISSIONS SHOULD ADVANCE A BROAD
CONCEPTION OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE
William Conklin has argued that access to legal justice is premised on the sepa-
ration of "valid legal rules/principles" from the non-law realm where "[jl]ustice
dwells,"23 and is thus invisible from the legal perspective. It is not possible to
attain full, real, or meaningful justice, or to even know what it is, by limiting
one's focus to the law.2" I agree that law commissions can neither identify justice
in its fullest sense, nor, therefore, make recommendations to achieve it, if they
do not incorporate frameworks and experiential and academic knowledge from
outside the world of law into their work concepts.
Although law commissions will vary in the extent to which they do operate
within an expanded concept of access to justice, in order to be effective, their
work must at times transcend the "boundaries of legal reality," as identified by
Conklin; that is, they must move outside these institutions (courts, legislatures,
subordinate agencies, and government officials) and concepts (doctrines, rules,
principles, and policies) in order to enter the non-legal realm, which is the place
where justice can be realized. I add a caveat here, however: to be clear, although
I argue that law commissions should be informed by, and make recommenda-
tions relevant to, a broad meaning of access to justice-one that is defined by
social or economic conditions, for instance-I part company with those who
contend that this is all that law reform commissions should be about, and that
they should not engage in the more prosaic law reform in areas that might be
described as "lawyers' law."25 While one might think that this kind of reform
23. William E. Conklin, "Whither Justice? The Common Problematic of Five Models of'Access
to Justice"' (2001) 19 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 297 at 297.
24. Ibid.
25. Thus, the Law Commission of Canada (LCC) "did not focus its efforts on 'moving periods
and semi-colons' so as to change the form of law," but rather saw that "the point of [its]
work was to engage not in law re-form, but in law re-substance," unless the "re-form brought
about substantive change or symbolic reorientation of the law." Macdonald, "Jamais," supra
note 1 at 132 [emphasis in original]. I do appreciate that sometimes a little reform is not a
step along the way to a broader justice, but rather may be an impediment; nevertheless, for
reasons I refer to below, I also appreciate that a law reform commission is "of this world" and
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can be accomplished quite adequately by government legal branches, there are
times when an independent review is useful.
Conklin's analysis helps to explain why law commissions must be prepared
to unpack the outward legal manifestations of socially determined relationships,
entitlements, and other legally relevant categories. Law commissions have not
only an "is," but also an "ought" responsibility if they are to play a role in en-
hancing access to justice (or, more accurately, to make recommendations with the
potential to achieve that objective). Conklin argues that while access to justice
is meant to flow from the application of the five models that he posits, it in fact
does not. This is because "justice," in all cases, is actually external or anterior to
the legal manifestation identified by the model.
In Conklin's first model, "law as procedure," access to justice is thought to
occur if the procedure is fair; next, the "sources" model assumes that it is suffi-
cient if the relevant decision emanates from an appropriate institution that has
acted within its jurisdiction. In both cases, these are models that apply in large
measure to administrative review. There is, however, no assessment of whether
the substantive outcome is actually "just"; substantive justice is merely inferred
from fair procedure or because the appropriate institution made the relevant
decision. The other models raise different concerns about justice. The "semiotic"
model posits that justice occurs when people are able to use legal language and
it is the language (i.e., "the narrative structure") that determines what is legally
authoritative or even what exists for legal purposes.26 Yet one is not expected to
ask why the language is considered authoritative; that is, the social reality behind
the language, or signs representing the social reality, are out of bounds and
perhaps unknown. The "unspoken social practices of a community "27 form the
core of Conklin's fourth, "social convention" model: they can illuminate how
practices deviate from what is expected and, thus, from justice. Unwritten prac-
tices that deviate from the "foundational unwritten social conventions"28 under-
mine justice, yet these conventions are unenforceable legally (here one thinks of
constitutional conventions-Conklin refers to these-and, to some extent, of
the foundational constitutional principles, although the legal status of the latter
not somehow above or beyond it.
26. Conklin, supra note 23 at 306.
27. Ibid. at 309.
28. Ibid. at 310.
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is rather more ambiguous). They become enforceable only when reduced to
writing, at which point they become legal rules or legal language alienated from
their origins.
The last model links "law and ... ," where the ellipsis is completed by a
discipline other than law. Under this model, access to justice is informed by
the insights from other disciplines; in this case, the "other" discipline is "exte-
rior to legal reality."29 This model is particularly relevant to the multidiscipli-
nary research a commission must undertake in order to inquire into questions
relating to access to justice in its fullest sense. Even though the "law and ... "
model suggests that justice can be ascertained, justice remains somewhere other
than law.
Pessimistically, Conklin concludes that in all of the legal models, justice is
unknowable by definition and, if we restrict our search for justice to the legal
world, unattainable.3" I do not feel as gloomy about whether one can attain some
type of justice by using only legal concepts. There is something to be gained
within the legal sphere, although at the risk that this "something" will be per-
ceived as a full account of what justice means in the particular context. I do find
Conklin's models useful, however, in explaining how justice in the broadest sense
cannot be ascertained or achieved only through the legal system itself. Conklin
posits his models as abstract, discrete, and bounded categories (they are, after
all, models). Under the source model, for example, law is neither concerned
with the events that led to the creation of the institution, nor with what concept
of "goodness" exists beyond the structure.31 This analysis forces one to examine
where law' begins and ends, but I would argue that the boundaries are in reality
less dense than the models portray, and that it is in the interstices between these
models that law commissions can make some of their most important contribu-
tions. To do so, however, they must accept, as Conklin argues, the legal system
as part of a larger confluence of events and disciplines, and bring these to bear
on their analyses of what were initially defined as "legal problems." At best, an
analysis based only on the law can result in only partial access to justice.
29. Ibid. at 311.
30. Although Conklin states that he cannot provide "a blueprint" that will disclose "the
experiential meanings which ... a [legal] structure and its language conceal," he can "offer
the questions." Ibid. at 316.
31. Ibid. at 303-04. Both are "oughts," or political in nature.
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Not everyone believes that law commissions have a major role to play in ad-
dressing substantive injustice (i.e., with respect to law that might require revising
rather than mere amending), since "[g] oals (and the concerns of substantive jus-
tice) are relegated to the realm of politics, while means (and the concerns of pro-
cedural justice) come to dominate law's empire."32 On this view, to the extent
that law commissions are intended to address "law" and not "politics," their
mandate is restricted to means, rather than goals-to accepting the system as
given in fundamental respects rather than as open to reconceptualization. The
distinction has been pithily articulated as speaking of access to justice as "rather
less of substantive steps to the creation of [a] 'just society' (whatever that may be)
and rather more of finding direct and affordable routes to a remedy for presumed
wrongs."33 It is, furthermore, relatively easy to talk about increasing access to jus-
tice through the legal system (although not necessarily easy to do), and much
harder to sort out how to advance more complex, multi-faceted access to justice.
A broader understanding of access to justice requires questioning the existing
legal framework in order to incorporate the worldviews and experiences of pre-
viously excluded groups.3 As Monture-OKanee and Turpel state, it is necessary
to engage in "a more fundamental or first-principles discussion of justice.
35
While this fundamental questioning is particularly apposite with respect to First
Nations, it is also appropriate to other contexts for the purpose of determining
whether the principles behind legal institutions and principles are-or ever
were-valid, or whether they have an undue and unnecessarily negative impact
on identifiable communities. It may also require rejecting legal categories in or-
der to capture the sub-text of an actual experience with law.
32. Macdonald, "Access," supra note 12 at 293. Macdonald recognizes that procedural changes
may have substantive consequences, although they may be unintended and often
undesirable, a situation he describes as "less justice" for "more iccess."
33. Roland Penner, "Access to Justice and Law Reform" (1990) 10 Windsor Y.B. Access Just.
338 at 338. Writing nearly twenty years ago, Penner refers to the mandate of law reform
commissions as limited to the "so-called technical aspects of the law" (at 339).
34. Reg Graycar & Jenny Morgan, "Law Reform: What's In It for Women?" (2005) 23 Windsor
Y.B. Access Just. 393 at 398. Lest this now seem obvious, the authors refer to studies by the
Law Commission of England and Wales and the New South Wales Law Reform
Commission (NSWLRC), which failed to take the broader view; alternatively, Graycar and
Morgan cite the Victorian Law Reform Commission as taking an appropriate approach.
35. P.A. Monture-OKanee & M.E. Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and Canadian Criminal Law:
Rethinking Justice" (1992) U.B.C. L. Rev. 239 at 241.
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Law has been shown to have feet of clay. Put another way, it has been de-
mocratized, made more accessible, and treated as one of a number of disciplines
that affect people's lives. Despite attempts to regulate different areas of our lives
and to establish borders delineating acceptable and unacceptable behaviour,
law finds itself outrun by technological advances. It is recognized, too, that
government is only one actor that influences how law is received and imple-
mented. 6
Law reform commissions are only one in a "crowded field" of law reform
agents that vary considerably in their format and function; 7 to earn their keep,
they must be qualitatively different from these organizations. Put bluntly, "[s]o
much law change is driven by political necessity, perceived electoral advantage
and special interest pleading. There are abundant opportunities for reactions to
those criteria. For law commissions to justify their existence, they must be in a
different league."3' 8 They must be neither too ethereal, nor too pedantic; they
must be just right, and "more than ... a de facto academic research body-or the
36. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the reasons for the change in law's status.
One can look at academic criticism, from the earliest critical legal realism movement through
to feminist and critical race theory, which questions either law itself or the fundamentals of
the current law; a general dislike of intellectualism and "elitism"; the role of other disciplines
in Charter jurisprudence (a reflection of the much earlier Brandeis brief in American
constitutional cases); the judges' own efforts to emphasize their "human side" and make the
institution of the judiciary more "accessible"; infamous miscarriages of justice; and a culture
that generally treats claims to expertise as inappropriate and futile, and promotes the
democratization of judgment. In many ways, these developments in law reflect those in other
disciplines and in society at large. For example, history loses its authority when it is
recognized as being "history" as defined by the winners and not by the losers, or when it is
expanded to explore the history of "ordinary" people.
37. David Weisbrot, "Annual Report 2004-2005 - Comments from the President," online:
ALRC <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/1 01/3.html>
[Weisbrot, "Annual Report"]. Weisbrot, President of the ALRC, identifies "government
departments, other statutory authorities, parliamentary committees, interdepartmental
committees, royal commissions, eminent persons' groups, non-government organizations,
university-based law reform institutes, private consultants, and other standing and ad hoc
bodies" as each having some kind of mandate to engage in law reform. See also Neave,
"Australia," supra note 6 at 351-52.
38. Justice Bruce Robertson, "Law Reform: What is knitting? How do we stick to it?" (Address
delivered to the Association of Law Reform Agencies of Eastern and Southern Africa
Conference, Cape Town, 15-17 March 2005) at 16, online: NZLC <http://www.lawcom.
govt.nz/SpeechPaper.aspx> [Robertson, "Law Reform"].
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clone of law advisers in government departments."39 Some of the distinctiveness is
reflected in structure and mandate: law commissions are meant to have some de-
gree of permanence; they are dedicated solely to law reform; they usually have
their own staff; they undertake the study of many different areas of law and pol-
icy; they are independent, both of government and of interest groups;"t they
tend to perform their work in public through the release of discussion papers and
interim reports; and they engage with affected communities, professional and
otherwise, in the study of an issue and the development of recommendations 
' 1
It has been suggested that the ideal for law reform commissions is to estab-
lish themselves as "an element in the constitutional arrangements for legal re-
newal ... [as] part of the furniture,142 or, in other words, as a part of the legal
landscape of liberal democracies that is accepted as necessary. History, however,
suggests that this is far from the case. 43 Even if they depend on the attorney
39. Justice Bruce Robertson, "Tradition and Innovation in a Law Reform Agency" (Address
delivered to the New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Victoria University, Wellington, 23
July 2002) at 2, online: <http://www.victoria.ac.nz/nzcpl/Files/Occ papers/Robertson web
paper.pdf> [Robertson, "Tradition"].
40. Put another way, they do not have a "professional constituency"; this was how Macdonald
described the LCC. Macdonald, "Jamais," supra note 1 at 138.
41. The nature of most law commissions becomes clearer when contrasted with the Uniform
Law Conference of Canada (ULCC), which is also devoted to law reform. The ULCC's
website explains that "[t]he Conference was founded in 1918 to harmonize the laws of the
provinces and territories of Canada, and where appropriate the federal laws as well. It also
makes recommendations for changes to federal criminal legislation based on identified
deficiencies, defects or gaps in the existing law, or based on problems created by judicial
interpretation of existing law." Online: <http://www.ulcc.ca/en/home/>. The ULCC, while a
permanent law reform body funded by government, nevertheless limits itself primarily to
recommending amendments to statutes, because it lacks the resources and, perhaps, the
inclination to engage in significant research and public consultation; its members are civil
servants whose work is more or less behind the scenes.
42. Justice Michael Kirby, "Law reform and human rights - Scarman's great legacy" (2006) 26
L.S. 449 at 463 (Kirby, "Law reform"]. Partnerships and collaboration with other actors with
a similar mandate, reflecting "recognition of the value of the institution by other leading
legal actors," enables the commission to establish itself as part of the legal landscape.
Macdonald, "Jamais," supra note 1 at 119. Of course, sometimes becoming "part of the
furniture" is taken for granted, and this is not something that a law commission desires.
43. On the ebb and flow of support for law commissions, see Gavin Murphy, Law Reform
Agencies (Department of Justice Canada, 2004), 2.1.4, online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/
eng/pi/icg-gci/lr-rd/index.html>; Neave, "Australia," supra note 6; and Handford, in/ra note 47.
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general to refer subjects for study to them, law commissions are able to address
matters that governments have neither the time nor inclination to address. Al-
though one might name characteristics necessary to a successful law commission
in addition to those above, two intangible elements are particularly crucial:
"process expertise" (i.e., understanding the process of law reform in the broadest
sense), and "corporate identity" (i.e., the agency as a distinct entity, composed
of members of a community with a clear appreciation of its mandate)." A
commission must also understand the legal and political contexts in which it
operates," and form both domestic and international partnerships." It should
be acknowledged that a law commission's decision to pursue the larger access
to justice questions is unlikely to be divorced from what else is going on in its
society, and whether it will be perceived as in step with these developments or
as a rogue organization. When there is a general commitment to extending
rights and viewing justice broadly, law commissions may feel more confident in
approaching their mandate broadly,"7 and they may receive more references
from the attorney general with "a strong social policy emphasis.""
I suggest that at least part of the answer to the question of what it means
for a law commission to distinguish itself lies in how it perceives access to justice.
44. The terms "intangible," "process expertise," and "corporate identity" are Sandra Petersson's.
See Sandra Petersson, "Law Reform Agencies: The Essential Elements" (Paper presented to
the Australasian Law Reform Agencies Conference, Wellington, New Zealand, 13-16 April
2004) at 2-3, online: NZLC <http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/SpeechPaper.aspx>.
45. Macdonald, "Jamais," supra note 1 at 119.
46. Justice Micheal Kirby, "Law Reform - Ten Attributes for Success" (Address presented to
The Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Dublin, 17 July 2007), online: The High Court of
Australia <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj-17jul07a.pdf> [Kirby, "Ten
Attributes"]; H. L. Awaseb, "Commentary on Sandra Petersson's Paper Titled: 'Law Reform
Agencies - The Essential Requirements"' (Commentary presented at the Biennial
Australasian Law Reform Agencies Conference, Wellington, New Zealand, 13-16 April
2004), online: NZLC <http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/SpeechPaper/06a9e58f-
befd-45d7-9df8-3ac07719aa76//Session 8B - Awaseb comment.pdf>.
47. As Neave suggests, interest in and support for law commissions seems to go through cycles,
and appears related to wider societal developments toward greater justice. Neave, "2 1st
Century," supra note 1. See also Weisbrot, "Annual Report," supra note 37. For details about
the decline of law reform agencies in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom, see Peter Handford, "The Changing Face of Law Reform" (1999) 73 Austl. L.J. 503.
48. This was the experience of the ALRC, according to its president. See Weisbrot, "Annual
Report," ibid.
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At one time, commissions were informed only by legal considerations, developed
projects identified by the legal profession (including judges), and consulted
only the legal profession. Their projects were determined "more in response to
lawyers'-dissatisfaction with the law and its processes than to the injustices felt
by citizens." 9 It can generally be said that this exclusive approach to law reform
by standing law reform commissions is widely considered to be long outmoded.
Rather, the spectrum of approaches to law reform today runs from "philosophy
(informative, contemplative and foundational) [to] politics (immediately rele-
vant and responsive).""0 And some would argue that responding to the more
immediate needs of government cannot be at the expense "of not taking things
for granted; of questioning the conventional wisdom; of not accepting that our
existing laws, structures and institutions are natural and inevitable-when in
fact they are historically contingent." 1
To the extent that the mandate of law commissions, either explicitly or
implicitly, is to enhance access to justice, they must decide whether or not they
think of justice, unmodified, as not only a legal term, but also as a social concept
that has-or that may require-a significant legal component. For law commis-
sions to successfully engage with the broadest terrain of access to justice, they
must adopt particular approaches to, and modes of analysis in, the work that
they do.
III. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO SAY THAT LAW REFORM COMMISSIONS
SHOULD ADVANCE ACCESS TO JUSTICE?
From an initial emphasis on the narrow, focused, and often technical or black
letter law questions that were the concern of earlier law reform bodies, law
commissions have evolved into bodies that are also concerned with large social
questions requiring multi/interdisciplinary empirical research and non-legal
49. Murphy, supra note 43.
50. Creative Symposium Report on the founding of the Law Commission of Ontario, 30
November 2006, cited in Law Commission of Ontario, "LCO Strategic Plan 2008-2012" (7
February 2008) at 5, online: <http://www.lco-cdo.org/en/documents/LCOstrategicplan-
final-april08.pdf>.
51. David Weisbrot, "The Historical Necessity of Law Reform" (The Alex Castles Memorial
Lecture in Australian Legal History, delivered at Flinders University Law School, 24 August
2006) at 6 [emphasis in original], online: ALRC <http://www.alrc.gov.au/events/speeches/
DW/20060824.pdf> [Weisbrot, "Historical"].
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expertise.52 They are well-suited to address a range of issues, including those at
opposite ends of the spectrum of technical and social issues: "[t]hese include
boring but essential tasks of statutory consolidation and revision; large tasks
touching the interests of many governmental and private bodies; and projects
necessitating consultation of the kind that the more traditional committees of
the legislature and the Executive Government are ill-suited to perform," 53 such
as the impact of the law on biotechnology. The Australian Law Reform Com-
mission (ALRC) has, in the words of its president, worked on projects "rang[ing]
from the modernisation of old laws to such 'over the horizon' projects as gene
patenting and the protection of human genetic information-where the ALRC
worked with leading scientists and policy makers to identify innovative solutions
to new and complex problems."
5 4
Some law commissions have indeed conceived of access to justice ambi-
tiously. The Law Reform Commission of Canada (LRCC) was instructed,
when it was created in 1971, to consider "the development of new approaches
to and new concepts of the law in keeping with and responsive to the changing
needs of modern Canadian society and of individual members of that society."55
This is a relatively broad mandate, and one that the LRCC addressed without
hesitation in its early days. Its role, its first chairperson said, was to "take into
account, articulate and help to shape [the] common values" that underlie the
"shared morality" of the law and society, "by widespread public argument and
by discussion in depth."56 But the LRCC's approach, under different leadership,
eventually became "more pragmatic and less broadly philosophic."" Many years
52. On the function of early law reform bodies, see Neave, "2 1st Century," supra note 1, noting
that "[t]he early work of State law reform bodies [prior to the 1970s and 1980s] focused on -
repeal of antiquated laws and the reform of areas of 'black letter' law, which were unlikely to
excite the interest of politicians or arouse community concerns." See also Murphy, supra note
43, 2.1.4.
53. Kirby, "Law reform," supra note 42 at 465. See also Justice Michael Kirby, "Law Reform &
Human Rights - Scarman's Great Legacy" (Lecture delivered to the Law Commission of
England and Wales, Gray's Inn, London, 20 February 2006) at 41, online: <www.lawcom.
gov.uk/docs/kirby-lecture.doc>.
54. Weisbrot, "Annual Report," supra note 37.
55. Law Reform Commission Act, R.S.C. 1969-70, c.6 4 , s.11.
56. Hurlburt, supra note 7 at 183, quoting Law Reform Commission of Canada, ThirdAnnual
Report 1973-1974: A True Reflection (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974) at 8-9.
57. Hurlburt, ibid. at 189.
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later, the LRCC's successor, the Law Commission of Canada (LCC), was well
known for its innovative approach to a far-reaching statutory mandate, which
was reflected in its decision to jettison the usual categories of law in favour of
relationships (i.e., personal, social, economic, and governance relationships).
58
The LRCC's mandate, its practice in its early days (which is now thirty-five
years ago), the LCC's mandate and practice, Macdonald (who was the major
influence on the LCC's practice), and Neave all interpret the contemporary
mandate of standing commissions as asking and answering difficult questions
about the legal framework of our society, or how law interacts with other ways
of ordering society. Often, this requires a law commission to approach a project
with the willingness to ask the questions that will permit it to reveal the under-
pinnings of the law, to-in the words of Monture-OKanee and Turpel-go
back to first principles, or to address the events behind the process, including
the structures, the doctrines, andthe language that Conklin identifies. 9
This means that law commissions will often make recommendations about
policy issues arising from a particular project. While government ultimately de-
termines its own policy direction-and, in the case of referrals to commissions,
may frame the reference with an implicit policy direction-this does not mean
that there will not be policy questions to consider. As two former members of
the New South Wales Law Reform Commission observed, "[p]olicy analysis
and development is something that law reform commissions do very well.""0
58. The LCC explained that "[t]he Commission intends to pursue its strategic direction by
structuring its research around four complementary themes: personal relationships; social
relationships; economic relationships; and governance relationships. These Strategic Themes
were distilled from ideas suggested by the broad spectrum of groups and individuals initially
consulted by the Commission. They were then confirmed by the Advisory Council." Online:
<http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/ 100/206/301/law-commission-of canada-ef/2006-12-06/
www.lcc.gc.ca/about/strategic-en.asp#themes>.
59. Sometimes urgency or resources, for example, direct the law commission along a simpler
route. And, sometimes, what is needed is not "the big complex project," but the one that
provides a useful service to practitioners and their clients by simplifying or clarifying the law
in an area.
60. Justice Michael Adams & Peter Hennessy, "Law Reform Commissions: Is there a place for
the principled study of criminal law issues?" (Paper presented to The International Society
for the Reform of Criminal Law, 15th International Conference: Politics and Criminal
Justice, Canberra, Australia, 26-30 August 2001), online: NSWLRC <http://www.lawlink.
nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/ph01>.
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In reality, even if they take a broad view of access to justice, most commis-
sions prefer a mix of projects. They want to assure credibility with several differ-
ent constituencies: the government, the legal community, disadvantaged groups,
and the general public, each of whom may have different expectations of the
law commission. It is important for commissions to produce final reports, and
multi-dimensional projects do take time. Therefore, not only are shorter, techni-
cal projects useful in themselves, even if they address a narrower point of justice,
but they may also help a commission maintain a longer, more complex strategic
direction. A former president of the NZLC has said that the Commission's ad-
herence to "a broad programme in such conventional areas as public law, com-
mercial law, [and] criminal law [allows it] ... more readily ... to resist unfair
criticism when engaging in more controyersial topics, such as Treaty work."6
These different approaches to law reform take us back to different concep-
tions of access to justice. Just as the meaning of access to justice has expanded,
so has the scope of the mandate of most law commissions. In neither case has
the original view (the meaning of access to justice or the mandate of law com-
missions) disappeared. On the contrary, in both cases, the work contemplated
by these traditional conceptions remains important, although how it is accom-
plished might be slightly different compared to the past.62 Even in these more
narrowly defined contexts, there is a recognition that the centrality of law has
diminished; nevertheless, its legitimacy and significance remains paramount.
The appeal to extra-legal considerations, whether in the framing of the
question, the research, the analysis, or the commission's recommendations, does
not mean ignoring law; rather, it directs attention to "the many legal conse-
quences of how (and with whom) we order our lives" within particular contexts.63
Law commissions are law commissions, and regardless of how broadly they
conceive their mandate, they are about law. If they want to destabilize law, then
it should be with the intent of transforming law to make it more equitable-
that is, more responsive to all citizens and to everyday life. Yet commissions
must operate with the knowledge that for law to have legitimacy, it must not
61. Baragwanath, supra note 1 at 13.
62. In both cases, at least some consideration will likely be given to the experiences and needs of
various communities (e.g., the poor, racial, gendered, disabled), but in both cases the results
will be well within a legal paradigm.
63. Graycar & Morgan, supra note 34 at 400. Graycar and Morgan's example is family law.
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only keep pace with changing societal conditions and norms, but must also, at
times, lead those changes. Law must act as an agent of cultural change, as well
as reflect the evolving culture of any society. In a liberal-democratic society, law
reform is a deliberate, progressive activity that seeks to ensure that law is accessible
and equitable. From this perspective, law reform is a normative activity. Thus,
at its best, it goes beyond tinkering or ensuring that specific legislative provisions
are not out of date (although it is also, of necessity, appropriately involved in such
work); in its more ambitious projects, it contemplates the reconceptualization
of legal frameworks and the integration of law with other disciplines.
IV. WHAT MUST LAW REFORM COMMISSIONS DO TO ADVANCE A
LARGER APPRECIATION OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE?
Conklin's models of access to justice all fail to reveal the larger confluence that
includes non-law (i.e., social, economic, and political) dynamics. A law com-
mission has the capacity to understand this confluence through its processes of
consultation, research, and analysis. If citizens are to participate in the develop-
ment of substantive law, and "multi-dimensional, integrated approaches"6 are
to be employed to achieve access to justice, there must be meaningful commu-
nity participation in law reform. Similarly, multidisciplinary research, analysis,
and advisory work that is directed at both legal and non-legal actors will help to
build bridges between the legal and non-legal realms.
It has been said that "good law reform work presupposes that regard will be
had to the way in which the law operates in practice; that is, how it impacts on
people's lives and on society generally."" One might add that it is equally im-
portant to consider how societal influences affect law. Most law commissions
studying the question of spousal abuse would not recommend longer jail terms
for abusers without having developed an understanding of, inter alia, who
commits abuse and who suffers it, why abuse occurs, whether imprisonment
has an impact on the abusers, what options abused spouses believe they have,
the message imprisonment sends about the phenomenon of spousal abuse, and
how both the abused spouse and other members of society respond to increased
prison sentences.
64. Bhabha, supra note 9 at 153.
65. Michael Tilbury, "Why Law Reform Commissions?: A Deconstruction and Stakeholder
Analysis from an Australian Perspective" (2005) 23 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 313 at 323.
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But "good law reform work"" requires more. Researchers investigating
the use of the legal system by abused women in immigrant communities, for
example, found that cultural norms, language barriers, and "perceived racism in
the criminal justice system and social service agencies" were only some of the
extra-legal factors that discouraged women from exercising their legal rights.67
Any attempt to increase access to justice for these women that considered the
cost of access to the legal system, to forms of dispute resolution, and to specific
recommendations (such as increased prison sentences), without taking these other
factors into account, would fail in its objective and could create false impressions
or expectations about the justice system. In making recommendations about
access to justice in this context, it would also be necessary to address the other
issues at stake. Factors external to law can make even "good" law inaccessible,
and can make a mockery of law's efforts to deal with a problem that has been
framed as legal, but which is really about power relations, economic disadvan-
tage, or some other "law and ... " issue.
Many commission studies address non-legal aspects of life that have an im-
pact on how effective law can be. A minor example can be found in the NSLRC's
1995 report on domestic violence, which recommended not only changes to
the Criminal Code (as well as other legislation) and different court structures,
but that there also be "safe and affordable housing" for women who are leaving
a violent partner.68 There is nothing particularly startling or novel about this,
but in addition there are those who wonder what there is about housing in this
context that makes it "law" and, thus, an appropriate law commission recom-
mendation. Justice Ronald Sackville, who served with the ALRC and as a royal
commissioner, appears to have a narrow conception of law commission work.
In his view, it is not within the mandates of royal commissions to inquire into
issues that are "well beyond the boundaries of law reform."69 He mentions that
66. Ibid.
67. Baukje Miedema & Sandra Wachholz, "A Complex Web: Access to Justice for Abused
Immigrant Women in New Brunswick" (March 1998) at v (Executive Summary), online:
Government of Canada Depository Services Program <http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/
Collection/SW21-24-1998E.pdf>.
68. Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, From Rhetoric to Reality - Ending Domestic
Violence in Nova Scotia: Final Report (Halifax: Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia,
1995) at 89.
69. Justice Ronald Sackville, "Law Reform Agencies and Royal Commissions: Toiling in the Same
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the recommendations of the Australian Deaths in Custody Commission con-
tained "topics that would not ordinarily be found in reports of law reform agen-
cies, such as proposals for improving housing and infrastructure for indigenous
communities and strategies for minimising the social and health problems Abo-
riginal people experience in consequence of alcohol use."7
Sackville's view represents neither the consensus nor the more desirable
approach. Today, law commissions make recommendations directed not only at
government, but also at industry, non-profit organizations, and other sectors.71
Usually, they recommend new legislation, amendments to legislation, or, less
often, that there be no change to legislation. In addition, commissions propose
the implementation of, inter alia, "new dispute resolution options; official stan-
dards and codes of practices; voluntary industry codes; education and training
programs; [and] better coordination of governmental (and intergovernmental)
programs."72 Even though it does not challenge law conceptually, 3 this wider
approach to recommendations may contribute to a broader understanding of
access to justice, since it recognizes that changes to law alone are unlikely to
Field?" (Paper presented to the ALRC, 30th Anniversary Symposium, Darling Harbour, 9 June
2005) at 13, online: Federal Court of Australia <http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/aboutct/ judges-
papers/speeches-sackvillej.html>. Another example that Justice Sackville cites is the
Fitzgerald Inquiry in Queensland, which "made far-reaching recommendations designed to
restore transparency and integrity to the Queensland electoral system and to the public
administration of the State." He adds that "[t]his is hardly a topic that is likely to be
entrusted to a law reform agency" (at 13).
70. Ibid. at 14.
71. Recommendations in the ALRC's report on the federal civil justice system, for example, were
directed not only at the Attorney General, but also at the courts and tribunals, the
Parliament, educational institutions, legal professional associations, and other bodies. See
David Weisbrot, "What's the Value of a Full Time Standing Law Reform Commission?
(You mean besides independence, quality scholarship, extensive public consultation,
corporate memory, cost effectiveness ... ?)" (Paper presented at the Australian Law Reform
Agencies Conference (ALRAC), Darwin, 20 June 2002), online: <http://www.alrc.gov.au/
events/speeches/DW/20020620.pdf> [Weisbrot, "Value"]; Australian Law Reform
Commission, ALRC Report 89: ManagingJustice: A review of the federal civil justice system -
Summary of Recommendations (Sydney: JS McMillan, 2000), online: <http://www.austlii.
edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/89/sumrec.html>.
72. Weisbrot, "Value," ibid. at 42.
73. While the recommendations of this broader approach go beyond law (primarily, in the
particular case, to private actors), they do not involve the establishment of new legal
paradigms. Hence, there is no challenge to law at the conceptual level.
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respond to the needs of many citizens. It does not, however, change the funda-
mental nature of a law commission's objective: to make the law more effective
in advancing access to justice by placing the law and its operation in context,
with respect to both determining the "real" problem and making recommenda-
tions to "solve" it.
The president of the ALRC, David Weisbrot, sees in the decline of law's
centrality an opportunity for law commissions to engage, if not in a wholly new
kind of law reform, then in reform that is far more in keeping with the dynamic
and ambivalent nature of many contemporary societies. He has added, to what
he describes as the "modernist" characteristics (permanent, full-time, independ-
ent, and authoritative), other characteristics that he describes as "post-
modernist" and "essential to the success of a contemporary law reform agency":
generalist, interdisciplinary, consultative, and implementation-minded.7" These
latter characteristics are among those commonly cited as necessary for a success-
ful commission and, at the same time, among those that differentiate law com-
missions from the myriad bodies engaged in law reform. Thus equipped,
commissions can respond to the "questioning of traditional authority"; to "a
greater appreciation of the complexity of social institutions and problems" that
lead to situations for which "no easy compromise or consensus solution is pos-
sible"; to recognition that power lies not only with government, but with other
institutions; to the understanding that solutions to problems are found not only
in government, but in the public, private, and "community-based" sectors; to
an appreciation that not all disputes are "legal"; and to a greater desire for, and
commitment to, "genuine public participation in civil society and public policy-
making."75
Not all welcome this challenge. For example, Weisbrot's compatriot at the
NZLC, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, views these developments as a threat to law com-
missions. He describes "post-modernism" as "an infection" that "constitutes a
serious challenge to law reform," because it is "marked by scepticism concerning
74. Weisbrot, "Historical," supra note 51 at 10-11. The "modernist" characteristics had been
identified in 1970 as reflecting "the qualitatively new principle" of law reform that "the
whole body of the law stood potentially in need of reform, and [that] there should be a
standing body of appropriate professional experts to consider reforms continuously." See
Geoffrey Sawer, "The Legal Theory of Law Reform" (1970) 20 U.T.L.J. 183 at 183
(emphasis in original], cited in Weisbrot, "Historical" at 9.
75. Weisbrot, "Historical," ibid. at 10.
796 (2008146 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the foundations of knowledge, ... points out the insoluble difficulties in postu-
lating coherent unitary texts or sets of legal principles," and "denies that there is
any independent authority in the law." 6 Deconstructing texts, he believes,
"suggests that everything is contingent and unstable," as it "destabilise[s] binary
oppositions."' "7 For him, these developments undermine trust in law and thus in
legal solutions, and this is the opposite of the vision underlying the formation
of law reform commissions as a means by which the law could be made more
"accessible, understandable, coherent and administered fairly by institutions
that are neutral and behave with integrity."7
As articulated by the presidents of the Australian and New Zealand law
commissions, respectively, this debate goes to the heart of the capacity of law
commissions to contribute to access to justice and to their willingness to travel
beyond the legal realm to the "ought" that can be found only in the non-legal
realm.
Sir Geoffrey Palmer's view suggests that law can operate effectively in relative
isolation and that it is sufficient for law to be perceived as being "correct" for it
to be effective. We look only to the law in order to determine whether or not
we have attained "justice," and to measure "access to justice." Access to justice
may therefore be defined as "access to law" or "access to the legal system," with
an emphasis on making the law clearer or minimizing economic barriers to the
use of the law. These are not insignificant goals, and reflect ongoing challenges
that need to be addressed seriously. Focusing even on these issues would require
resources and an understanding of who is affected negatively by, and who benefits
from, complex laws and expensive proceedings.
The Weisbrot attitude reflects a different mindset: it does not fear that
other influences will diminish law, but believes, rather, that law can be made
more effective through "opening-up," whether through consultation or through
interaction with other disciplines.79 This approach is inclined to view a law
76. Geoffrey Palmer, "Law Reform and the Law Commission in New Zealand After 20 Years -
We Need to Try a Little Harder" (Address delivered to the New Zealand Centre for Public
Law, Victoria University of Wellington, 30 March 2006) at 7-8, online: NZLC
<http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/SpeechPaper.aspx>.
77. Ibid. at 8.
78. Ibid. at 11.
79. In Canada, the LCC's governing statute most closely reflected the so-called "post-modern"
model. It specified that the advice the "independent" commission was to provide would be
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commission's "corporate identity" as consonant with a concept of access to justice
that views legal justice as only part of the puzzle, and only part of the ultimate
goal of broad societal changes. It encourages law commissions to develop the
capacity to meet Conklin's challenge by including the extra-legal notions of
justice and the impediments to justice that a blinkered focus on law will conceal.
In other words, it will help commissions make recommendations that are more
likely to enhance a broad concept of access to justice.
Public participation, multiple normative orders, and inter/multidisciplinary
analysis are interrelated, and they are all crucial to taking a broader view of access
to justice. The existence of multiple normative orders in a pluralist society, such
as different sources of law or authority, requires a commission to engage with a
far wider range of communities than ever before. Public participation is a form
of research that reveals different methods of viewing and categorizing law, and
the nature of the commission's analysis and recommendations must reflect that
diversity in experience and knowledge, whether academic or experiential. As the
first chairperson of the ALRC observed, there is a "need for a new legal begin-
ning in the relationship between the ethnic majority of settlers and their descen-
dants and the indigenous peoples of Australia."8"
One of the major sources of distinction between older law reform bodies and
some contemporary entities engaged in law reform, including most law com-
missions today, is the nature of the consultation process, which involves who is
consulted and how. The New Zealand Law Commission Act 1985 is unusual in
requiring the NZLC to "take into account te ao Maori (the Maori dimension)
based on the knowledge and experience of a wide range of groups and individuals; "the
commission's work should be open to and inclusive of all Canadians and the results of that
work should be accessible and understandable"; it should use a "multidisciplinary approach";
it should be "innovative" in its methodology, its "consultative processes," and all aspects of
its work; and it should consider, along with cost-effectiveness, "the impact of the law on
different groups and individuals in formulating its recommendations." See Law Commission
of Canada Act 1996, S.C. 1996, c. 9, Preamble. Among other aspects of its mandate, it was
enjoined, under s. 3, to advise on "the development of new approaches to, and new concepts
of, law." The Act remains in force, although funding to the LCC was cut in 2006 and it is
no longer able to operate.
80. Justice Michael Kirby, "Reforming Thoughts Across the Tasman" (Paper presented to the
Law Commission of New Zealand, Twentieth Anniversary Conference: "What is Distinctive
about New Zealand Law and the New Zealand Way of Doing Law?," 25 August 2006) at
11, online: NZLC <http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/SpeechPaper.aspx> [Kirby, "Tasman"].
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and [to] also give consideration to the multicultural character of New Zealand
society."'" This requirement has been described as a "wide mandate" that
"marked the new Commission out from virtually every other law reform
agency."8 2 There is a relationship between the answers to the questions raised
and the reform body's capacity to contribute to access to justice. Indeed, it has
been argued that it is part of carrying out the law reform mandate in an ethical
way.83 On the other hand, the independence of the law commission is a sine qua
non of its effectiveness and legitimacy, and this independence must be not only
from government, but also from interest groups or particular communities.
One aspect of this challenge has been articulated as follows:
The challenge for law reformers is to find a resolution of the tension between what is
pragmatically achievable and what principle and integrity suggest. There is an ongo-
ing challenge for us all in how we engage with politicians, the bureaucracy, the judi-
ciary and the wider community without being captured by any of them. We cannot
hope to be relevant or effective if we have an agenda which is unrelated to current
needs, perceptions and aspirations. But law reform bodies must be alongside these
other parts of the community and not submerged by them.
84
At the same time, there are inevitably gray areas, and one person's "prag-
matic" (good and sensible) may be another's "political" (choosing the safe option
or compromising independence to ensure continued support). Additionally,
independence is not inconsistent with the obligation to be accountable to funders,
since accountability takes the form of excellent work, rather than a willingness
to accede to any requests from funders to make particular recommendations. It
has to be recognized, however, that "[tihere is a very subtle and indeed complex
balance between autonomy and accountability."" .
Contemporary law commission inquiries that recognize the influence of
the non-legal world require consultation with communities directly affected by
the law that may have distinctive experiences with law and the legal system. 86 It
81. Supra note 3, s. 5(2)(a).
82. Kirby, "Tasman," supra note 80 at 20. There is also a separate Maori Committee "available to
advise and consult with the Commission." See Robertson, "Law Reform," supra note 38 at 8.
83. Neave, "Reform," supra note 1.
84. Robertson, "Law Reform," supra note 38 at 12.
85.. Baragwanath, supra note 1 at 4.
86. Neave, "Reform," supra note 1. The importance of consultation to the ALRC is explained by
one of its commissioners. See Rosalind Croucher, "Law Reforming - the whys, wherefores and
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should not be assumed, however, that these participants are not capable of
also contributing to explanations about how they are affected by more technical
areas of law, or that lawyers do not have something to say about broader issues.
Although these consultations seek input from members of the communities
affected by the law under study, they also perform other pragmatic functions.
They may assist in correcting errors, pressuring government to respond to the
law commission's report,8 7 and promoting the "public ventilation of issues" to
help develop consensus or at least "defuse lingering tensions" around issues. 88
This applies not only to community groups, but also to professionals; thus,
"[s]ome commissions are also beginning to think about how to change the cul-
ture of institutions, such as courts and the police, to ensure that any legislative
amendments work in the way intended."89
It has been suggested, however, that public involvement goes beyond en-
suring an excellent report, and extends to "deliberative democracy," the more
direct involvement of the populace in decision making, or, put another way,
the enhancement of civil society.9 Neave suggests that law commissions can
contribute to deliberative democracy by involving citizens who normally do not
engage in public policy processes, including the development of policy, by in-
where-tos" (Address delivered to the Legal Studies Teachers Conference, Sydney, 24 August
2007) at 6, online: ALRC <http:lwww.alrc.gov.aulevents/speeches/RC/20070824.pdf>.
Professor Croucher quotes the agency's president as saying: "we do [public consultation]
because we know it significantly improves the quality, the grass roots applicability, and (not
surprisingly), the public acceptability of our recommendations." Even more narrowly defined
projects directed at increasing access to the courts, tribunals, and other dispute resolution
processes require the input of members of the public who have to deal with the system, not
only that of lawyers and other legally trained individuals and groups.
87. Kirby, "Ten Attributes," supra note 46.
88. Weisbrot, "Value," supra note 71 at 13.
89. Neave, "Ausrralia," supra note 6 at 361. Neave points out that "[l]ong before a formal report
is published, the law reform process can identify problems, expose key people to critical
perspectives and persuade them to participate in bringing about change."
90. Neave, "Reform," supra note 1. See also Kirby, "Ten Attributes," supra note 46; Robertson,
"Tradition," supra note 39. Justice Robertson provides detail about the nature of the
consultation paper and communication methods for a project on revising the New Zealand
courts with the objectives of making the paper accessible to persons without a legal
background and arranging meetings at the place convenient to the communities involved.
This approach was not without criticism, since the plain writing of the paper was described
by one person as "useful for explaining what I do to my granddaughter."
800 [200814-6 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
cluding them in discussions about their work. Citizen consultation, in various
formats that promote accessibility, becomes an integral part of the law commis-
sions' processes.91
A president of the LCC has even suggested that the most successful law
commission would make itself redundant by convincing citizens that law reform
is something that they should do themselves, and not through the law reform
agency as intermediary. The "primary" role of law reform commissions "should
be to educate and empower citizens to assume their role as law-makers," based
on "a conception of law not as a series of rules enacted by government but rather
as the normative infrastructure of society that emerges from quotidian human
interaction."92 Thus, the LCC was "first and foremost an experiment in the
democratization of law reform, notably through an enlargement and rebalancing
of the actors involved in the process of law reform and a reconceptualization of
research projects. ""
I do not go this far, because the disinterest, process expertise, and corporate
identity of a commission allow for law reform projects that cut across subject
areas and communities, as well as, one hopes, a continuing productive relation-
ship with government. This seems a fair trade-off between the possibly extreme
version of deliberative democracy and the continued output of law reform ini-
tiatives.
More basically, the importance of citizen involvement in law reform has
been interpreted as meaning that the law reform agencies should have members
who are not lawyers, judges, or law professors. The LCC had commissioners
who were not trained in law. As one non-lawyer member of the NSLRC has ex-
plained, "non-lawyers serve to remind the Commissioners and staff of the pub-
lic comprehension of what the law involves, the specific needs of some
members of the public and the legally trained people needed to ensure the re-
forms are legally workable."9" He noted that his questions encouraged commis-
91. Neave, "Australia," supra note 6 at 366.
92. Macdonald, "Jamais," supra note 1 at 140-41.
93. Yves Le Bouthillier, "Introduction - Dossier: The Law Commission of Canada / La
Commission du droit du Canada" (2007) 22:2 C.J.L.S. 113 at 114.
94. Dale Sylliboy, "Law and Social Policy: Representing Society and the Role of Non-Lawyers
on Law Reform Commissions" (Paper presented to the Commonwealth Law Conference,
August 1996) [on file with author].
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sioners "to articulate their assumptions.""5 On the other hand, Justice Michael
Kirby96 suggests that it is not necessary, particularly in smaller commissions, to
appoint non-legally trained commissioners, "[b]ut that should not silence such
viewpoints in the Commission's deliberations."97 In one way or another, it is
crucial to include non-legally trained persons in the process. This may occur
through the retaining of consultants or advisors, and also through the inclusion
of a wide variety of groups in the suggestions for projects or the consultation
process. There must be a check on whether law commissions have challenged
legal structures, processes, and language.
A commitment to community participation requires innovative means of
communication or interaction, such as "talk-back radio," "telephone 'hotlines, "'98
and the "new" media (e.g., blogs or wikis) that may attract different people to
the work of the law reform body. The ALRC has been innovative not only in
initial consultation, but also in maintaining contact with various groups. For its
big project on privacy, the ALRC developed a "Talking Privacy Website - Young
People and Privacy," which used flash multimedia technology and music, and
included an on-line forum to enable users to comment on the project. It also
developed on-line resources for teachers that assisted them in integrating mate-
rials about privacy and law reform into high school legal studies curricula.99 In
Canada, the LCC commissioned a documentary film about Canada's Indigenous
legal traditions for its project of the same name, ran contests for high school
students that explored particular themes through essays, poems, artwork, and
multimedia, and developed a discussion group kit and an on-line quiz for its
project on electoral reform."0
95. Ibid.
96. Former Justice of the High Court of Australia (1996 to 2009) and the inaugural chairperson
of the ALRC.
97. Kirby, "Ten Attributes," supra note 46 at 9. Perhaps it is not insignificant that he is Justice
Kirby. For an overview of membership, see Murphy, supra note 43.
98. Weisbrot, "Value," supra note 71 at 12. The NSWLRC has used similar techniques. See The
New South Wales Law Reform Commission, "The Law Reform Process: a Step-by-step
Guide," online: <http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlinkllrc/llirc.nsf/pages/LRC aboutl>.
99. David Weisbrot, "After Dinner Address" (presented to the Legal Studies Teachers Association,
22 March 2007), online: ALRC <http://www.alrc.gov.au/events/speeches/DW/index.htm>.
100. See online: <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/lOO/206/30 1 /law-commission of canada-ef/2006-12-
06/www.icc.gc.calpartnership/default-en.asp>.
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Law commissions must also be prepared to move outside the parameters of
law in other ways, as well, if they are to make a significant contribution. They are
particularly well-suited to carry out research and analysis, and propose recom-
mendations that cut across traditional categories of law, of academic disciplines,
and of understandings about what constitutes knowledge. One example of an
area that dissolves categories is family violence: it "cuts across criminal law, family
law, housing law, social security law, and administrative law (inter alia), and
involves [in Australia] questions of State and Federal law, and court and tribunal
processes."'"' It also cuts across disciplines, requiring the benefit of sociology,
psychology, and other bodies of knowledge, and requires the involvement of
those who have experienced family violence from all perspectives.
The benefit of this transboundary work can also be achieved through part-
nership with other organizations. The ALRC has undertaken projects with spe-
cialized federal agencies, such as a joint project on the use of human genetic
information with the Health Ethics Committee." 2 The LCC was encouraged to
develop "cooperative efforts" with others; it "partnered" with the Canadian Law
and Society Association, with whose members the LCC carried on "sustained
dialogue ... in conferences, informal meetings and collaborative projects."10 3 It
also collaborated with the British Columbia Treaty Commission to hold a treaty
forum entitled "Speak Truth to Power" and to publish the papers delivered at
that forum.'
Recognition of the needs and experiences of excluded communities and an
analysis informed by extra-legal factors and perspectives in a law commission's
discussion papers and reports may result in criticism of, and challenges to, the
101. Weisbrot, "Value," supra note 71 at 10. I note here that, in a federal state, there may be questions
about the extent to which a provincial law commission should tread on matters within federal
jurisdiction. It will sometimes have to address the ramifications of federal law and policy for
provincial law and policy, and there may be opportunities to suggest creative ways to address
the relationship between the two. A federally established commission faces a similar challenge.
102. Brian Opeskin, "The ALRC and the Role of Law Reform" (Lecture delivered at Melbourne
University, JD Program Guest Lecture Series, 4 April 2001), online: ALRC
<http://www.alrc.gov.au/events/speeches/BRO/20010404.htm>. Opeskin discussed two
efforts to co-ordinate with state law commissions in Australia that have not been successfll.
103. Le Bouthillier, supra note 93 at 113.
104. Law Commission of Canada & British Columbia Treaty Commission, Speaking Truth to
Power: A Treaty Forum (2001), online: <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/ 100/206/30 1/law-
commission-of canada-ef/2006-12-06/www.lcc.gc.calpartnership/treaty-main-toc-en.asp>.
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government. A wise government will recognize that this will inform the issue at
hand and facilitate effective recommendations. Some governments may be less
receptive. The reality is that, without government recognition, a law commission
can be a voice in the wilderness, and this is something that many commissions
have felt themselves to be. In all cases, commissions are reliant on government
both for their funding, or at least a part of it, and for their recommendations to
be included on the legislative agenda. In many cases, commissions also rely on
government for at least some of their projects and for approval of their programs
and the reports thereof.05
Well-intentioned governments, too, must recognize that they have an obli-
gation to tread carefully in their interactions with law commissions if both parties
are to preserve and benefit from their relationship. The relationship between a
law reform agency and the government is a sensitive one. Despite the need to
act independently and impartially, a law commission should know what is on
the government's agenda and take note of the areas in which the government
has an interest and those in which it does not. This is especially true for self-
referential commissions. For a number of reasons, it is desirable that a commis-
sion have the authority to develop its own projects, even if not exclusively. The
commission should be seen as an independent body and not merely as an agent
of government. It should not treat itself as a mere extension of the government's
policy or legislative branch. Instead, it should be able to address questions for
the future and not be perpetually concerned with the government's agenda. It
should be able to look at difficult questions that the government may wish to
avoid, with the goal of influencing, if not government, then others interested in
law reform. It should be able to use its resources most effectively, and not risk
consuming them in a series of "quick and limited political job[s]""1 6 or on narrow
technical amendments that would be better done by bureaucrats.
105. The relationship with government must also include the bureaucracy, since that is where the
work is actually done. Civil servants are more likely to know what is being done in their
departments than are their political masters or even deputy ministers. See Murphy, supra
note 43, 2.1.5. It is also helpful when not only the executive, but also the other parties and
members of the legislature, are aware of the commission and its work. It may be more
feasible for a commission to develop these relationships when at least part of its program is
self-referred and it does not have to report to government before it can release its reports.
106. Kirby, "Tasman," supra note 80 at 33. Justice Kirby discusses the advantages of "self-
starting" generally (at 33).
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Community participation and multidisciplinary analysis informed by dif-
ferent normative orders help to unpack the assumptions beneath the surface of
law-that is, what lies behind and beyond legal institutions, including process
and language. Governments need to be tolerant of this expansive view of access
to justice, which may show how government, in its role as legislator, interrelates
with other actors and, indeed, relies on other actors for the success of its own
legislative mission-a reality reflected in the commission's recommendations.
Governments make the decisions about the implementation of commission
reports; they will pick and choose recommendations that will advance their own
conception of justice. While commissions should acknowledge this reality and
recognize that one of their major goals is to influence the reform of law (even if
it is not always reconceptualized), they can also make contributions that bear
fruit in the future or provide the basis on which others can more effectively
advance the access to justice agenda.
It must be remembered that reports often have a value beyond implemen-
tation by the government (or even by other actors to whom the recommenda-
tions may be directed). In this regard, Justice Kirby counsels patience, recognizing
that the impact of the commission's work may be long-term and difficult to
track specifically.' Even when recommendations are enacted, their success may
be surpassed by the contribution that the commission has made to developing
public interest in, and expectations about, law reform." 8
V. "GETTING IT RIGHT": PUTTING LAW COMMISSIONS AND ACCESS TO
JUSTICE IN PERSPECTIVE
Law commissions are not suited to all law reform activity. For example, some
matters are more properly assigned to formal inquiries headed by retired or sit-
ting judges, such as those where it is necessary to hear witnesses. This is not
107. Kirby, "Ten Attributes," supra note 46 at 17. Justice Kirby points out here, and elsewhere,
the importance of ensuring that the commission maintains some distance from government
in order to be seen as a separate and independent institution, while at the same time working
with government officials to maximize the implementation of its reports. Even if reports'are
never implemented, they may have an impact, as did the ALRC's report on Aboriginal
customary law which, in Justice Kirby's view, "contributed to a change in the Zeitgeist of
Australia concerning the relationship between Aboriginals and the law" (at 17).
108. Justice Michael Kirby, Reform the Law- Essays on the renewal of the Australian legal system
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983) at 19, cited in Croucher, supra note 86 at 7.
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something for which a law commission has the legal tools; it is quite simply not
in the commission's mandate. Although other matters might properly be handled
by law commissions, it is sometimes necessary to establish ad hoc bodies simply
because of the time and resources required to deal with the matter adequately.
Law reform commissions do not have to do all of the law reform because,
pragmatically, they cannot. They do, however, have the advantages of relating
projects to each other. They develop an evolving expertise in the business and
ethic of law reform. They establish connections with a wide range of professional
and community groups that will be interested in a variety of projects. They link
projects to contribute to an ongoing societal conversation about law reform.
These are only some of the advantages of standing law reform commissions,
and they are advantages that are particularly relevant to access to justice.
Even when it has not been successful in having its recommendations imple-
mented, the benefits of a law commission are more likely to derive from a body
that is permanent and is able to build on its previous work. For example, the
value of the IMiternational Law Commission lies not in the number of conventions
and protocols resulting from the Commission's work (although there have been
those), but in its influence in consolidating international law. As one commen-
tator notes, "more generally, its intellectual approach to establishing coherent
bodies of rules in different areas has given an overall solidity to international
law which was previously lacking."1"9 Similarly, it has been suggested that "the
overwhelming reason to have a law, commission, and the hallmark against which
we should determine whether one is effective, is whether, in all areas of the law
and its manifestations, the fundamentally excluding attitudes and approaches
are being challenged and sensible alternatives are being offered to them. 110
To avoid getting lost in the crowded field of law reformers, law commissions
must be prepared to attempt "the 'larger more profound' tasks"11' that have the
potential not only to improve access to justice, but also to redefine what it means.
An Australian commissioner has commented that "[flaw reform publications-
109. Keith, supra note 1 at 4, citing Sir Arthur Watts, The International Law Commission, 1949-
1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
110. Robertson, "Law Reform," supra note 38 at 9-10.
111. Kirby, "Tasman," supra note 80 at 35, quoting Geoffrey Palmer, President of the New
Zealand Law Commission. Cf, however, Palmer's views on so-called "post-modernism,"
supra note 76.
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especially the final reports-provide an enormous contribution to legal history,
through the mapping of law as at a particular moment in history." '112 This is a
useful exercise, but law commissions must go further. They must also be prepared
to map law as it relates to other normative orders and other disciplines as a means
of showing how this interrelationship will increase access to justice in the par-
ticular case.
Law reform commissions can be good at law reform in all kinds of areas,
and should not hesitate to undertake projects of all sizes and shapes in adverse
areas. Where they can excel, however, is in the big projects that best achieve access
to justice in the fullest sense. Law commissions that are concerned with the
ultimate goal of making recommendations that enhance justice beyond law, by
using law-albeit not always satisfying the goal-are most likely to show the
value of permanent independent law commissions in comparison to other law
reform bodies. The results of projects initiated by these commissions may be
great-such as the reconceptualization of an area of law or a qualitative shift in
how we understand entitlement to access justice-or they may be small, as even
ostensibly minor amendments to legislation that can nevertheless have a big
impact for particular communities. When done well, law commission reports can
contribute significantly to the dialogue about what access to justice means and
how it can be achieved. Ultimately, however, what a law commission really
needs-as does any body responsible for law reform and any group that has been
marginalized-is a culture to operate in that is committed to treating a broad
understanding of increased access to justice as a natural element in its evolution.
112. Croucher, supra note 86 at 9.
